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RULE 10b-5 AND THE PERSONAL BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT: DIRKS v. SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
PAUL LANSINGt
& CRIS ALAN SCHOONt

In order to protect investors and to prevent the control of stock prices by
corporate insiders, the prohibition of insider trading has become afundamental goal of the courts and the SEC in enforcing the securities laws.
Brokers who reveal inside information to their clients may be in violation
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 andRule lob-5.
In Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission, the Supreme Court
narrowedthe scope of lob-5 liability by establishinga new personalbenefit requirement. This Article examines the Dirks decision and the hability of brokers who reveal inside information about corporatefraud, and
concludes thatfurther guidancefrom the courts and the SEC is necessary.
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INTRODUCTION

The issue has become a familiar one in the securities regulation
arena: when does an actor violate the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 by trading or inducing others to
trade in the stock exchange on the basis of material inside information 2 that has not been fully disclosed to the public? One would
expect the answer to come from a simple reading of the statute or
rule. Yet the courts have laced section 10(b) of the Securities Ex1. The antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b), is
set out as amended in section 78 of title 15 of the United States Code. Section 10(b) reads
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to administer section 10(b), is set out in section 240. lOb-5 of title 17 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
2. Whether information is material depends on whether it is likely that a reasonable
investor's decision to trade at the prevailing market price would be affected by disclosure
of such information. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiducia PrtncipOle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 n. 171 (1982); cf.TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (omitted fact is material in shareholders' vote if there is substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact important in deciding
how to vote). The Federal Securities Code bases the insider trading prohibition on the
insider's knowledge of a "fact of special significance." FED. SEC. CODE §§ 202(56),
1603(a) (A.L.I. 1980). A subsequent revision of the Code makes this standard applicable
only in private rights of action. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a) (A.L.I Supp. 1981). See
generally Langevoort, supra, at 43 n. 171.
"Inside information" has been defined as non-public facts concerning the business of
an issuer, one of its securities, or the market for its securities, and, insofar as the facts relate
to the issuer's business, in the usual case are intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Maher v. Williston & Beane, Inc., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 93,457, at 92,259 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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change Act and its corresponding administrative provision, Rule
lOb-5, with such complex and inconsistent underpinnings that an
examination of the history and development of the law is required
to address this issue.
The enforcement of Rule lOb-5 is intended to have a substantial
impact on the behavior of insiders3 and brokers. 4 Rule 10b-5 is
foremost a deterrent against fraudulent and unfair trading practices. 5 Defendants found guilty of violations of the securities laws
may be subject to criminal sanctions. 6 In the case of a broker, his
license may be revoked or suspended. 7 A private cause of action
for monetary damages is also available for violations of section
10(b).8 Nevertheless, if Rule 10b-5 applies in a situation such as
the one presented in the Supreme Court decision in Dirks v. Securzties and Exchange Commzssion,9 it could inhibit or totally prohibit "in3. An insider has been defined as any person having "access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone." Texas Guf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. An insider is usually a director or
officer of the corporation. See id., see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912; infra note 30.
One commentator has argued that without Rule lOb-5 or any enforcement thereunder, more insiders would trade on their nonpublic information, thus increasing the volume
of trade on the exchanges. The price of a stock will similarly increase when insiders with
material, nonpublic information purchase shares of the security, even if the purchase is
from stockholders who do not have such knowledge. This theory concludes that the price
of stock will more accurately reflect its real value if insiders are allowed to trade on their
nonpublic information. See Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Faimress" versus
Economic Theog;, 37 Bus. LAW. 517, 522 (1981-1982).
4. A broker "trades on [a client's] behalf with another broker who represents a buyer
or seller." 5B A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 210.02 (2d ed.
rev. 1984). A dealer sells a security to a client "out of [the dealer's] inventory or purchases
it from [the client] for [the dealer's] own account." Id For purposes of this Article, the
word "broker" will be used to refer to both brokers and dealers.
5. The preamble of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 provides evidence of legislative intent: "To provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent frauds in the sale thereof,
and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, preamble, 48 Stat. 74, 74
(1933).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982) (violation of 1933 Securities Act subjects offender to fine of
up to $10,000, or imprisonment for up to five years, or both); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982)
(violation of 1934 Securities and Exchange Act subjects offender to fine of up to $500,000,
or imprisonment for up to five years, or both); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1982) (violation of 1940
Investment Company Act subjects offender to fine of up to $10,000, or imprisonment for
up to five years, or both); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1982) (violation of Investment Advisors Act
subjects offender to fine of up to $10,000, or imprisonment for up to five years, or both).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-Z (1983).
8. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
9. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). The Securities Exchange Commission will hereinafter be
abbreviated as SEC.
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siders" or brokers from exposing corporate criminal behavior that
is brought to their attention through material nonpublic information. 10 Applying Rule lOb-5 in such a manner would discourage
brokers from ferreting out fraud and illegalities within corporations in which their clients and the public hold vital interests."I
The Supreme Court used the opportunity presented in Dirks to
establish and apply a new "personal benefit" requirement to Rule
lOb-5 actions. 12 After Dirks, personal benefit to an insider must be
proven in order to convict or establish liability under lOb-5.1 3 The
purpose of this Article is to review the goals and objectives of the
federal securities laws, specifically section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, in
light of Dirks. The Article examines the Dirks decision to determine what impact the new personal benefit rule will have on the
future behavior of analysts, stockbrokers, and insiders. The Article
also explores what effect the new requirement may have on the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) efforts to enforce the
intent of the securities laws.14 Finally, the Article examines the
merits and methods of disclosing corporate criminal activity and
how the Dirks personal benefit requirement may frustrate attempts
to halt this activity.
10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussion of "material" information).
11. See In re Dirks [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, at
83,950 (1981). A broker would be discouraged from disclosing fraud under the SEC's
Dirks decision. The SEC outcome could subject brokers who expose fraudulent or deceptive practices to criminal penalties and private civil actions. To avoid these penalties,
brokers would abstain from disclosing inside information about fraudulent corporate adtivity. Brokers would not search out and expose fraudulent schemes in their beginning
stages for fear of 10b-5 liability. The fraud would go undetected, injuring more people
than if it had been initially disclosed and stopped. See inyfra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
12. See 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3268 (1983).
13. Id at 3266.
14. The recent release of a Ralph Nader study on insiders who must file with the SEC
when they trade, and the subsequent violations of federal securities laws which Nader
uncovered, are evidence of the timeliness of this Article. The Nader study of 20 blue-chip
corporations found that 74 of their directors in certain years had not filed required reports
of any stock trades with the SEC, even though there apparently had been changes in the
size of their holdings. The SEC had not filed court charges against any of the executives
for violating the filing requirement, Nader argued. Hudson, Many DirectorsIgnore SEC Rule
on Stock Trades, Nader Study Concludes, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 36, col. 3. This Article
analyzes several of the problems raised by the Nader report: apparent disconcern or ambiguity in regulating insider trading; inconsistency in the enforcement of the laws; and lack
of SEC resources to do anything about many violations. The Wall Street Journalnoted one
SEC official who claimed that the agency did not have enough workers to do anything
about even those obvious reporting violations that their computers flagged. Id,. see also
iqa note 160.
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II.

HISTORY AND GOALS OF RULE

10B-5

Section 10(b) was adopted as part of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The Act provides for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and
foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices.' 5 The 1934 Act embraces a fundamental
purpose to substitute the philosophy of full disclosure for the
philospophy of caveat emptor in the exchange of securities in the
public marketplace.' 6 The legislative history and language of section 10(b) demonstrate that Congress intended the statute to act as
7
a broad prohibition against securities fraud.'
The 1934 Act and its progeny were designed to eliminate certain
abuses in the securities industry that contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Depression of the 1930's.' 8 Congress en15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975). The House
Report on the Act proposed that, "[t]o insure to the multitude of investors the maintenance of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national exchanges are banned." United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1381, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
The benefits and detriments of insider trading are discussed thoroughly in Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on ImpersonalStock Markets: Who is Harmed,and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lob-5,', 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1225-45 (1981).
16. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). One of the
purposes of the Act was "to purge the securities exchanges of those practices which have
prevented them from fulfilling their primary function of furnishing open markets for securities where supply and demand may freely meet at prices uninfluenced by manipulation or control." Charnay, 537 F.2d at 347 (quoting S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
81 (1934)).
17. Chamay, 537 F.2d at 347-48. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the Court discussed the broad application of section 10(b). The
Court stated that since practices "constantly vary and where practices legitimate for some
purposes may be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers
in the regulatory agency have been found practically essential . . . . Section 10(b) must
be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Id at 12 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934)).
18. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1982)), was preceded by the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L.
No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)), and
followed by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 333, 49 Stat.
803 (1935) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982)), the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, Pub. L. No. 253, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982)), the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat.
789 (1940) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1982)), and the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 837, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1984)). Id All of these acts have governed the issuance and trading of securities.
For a general analysis of 1920's market manipulation problems and subsequent Con-
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acted the Securities Exchange Act to eliminate the idea that the
use of inside information for personal advantage was a "normal
emolument of corporate office."' 9 Hence, Rule 10b-5 was devised
by the SEC in 1942 under the authority of section 10(b). 2 0 Rule
10b-5 was adopted in order to close "a loophole in the protection
against fraud . . . by prohibiting individuals or companies from
21
buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchases.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thus form the core of federal securities fraud law under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In addition to the aims espoused by the legislative and administrative branches, the judiciary has also broadly interpreted the
goals of 10b-5. Courts have enumerated a number of policy objectives when examining activities alleged to infringe Rule 10b-5: to
maintain free and honest securities markets; 22 to supply equal access to information;2 3 to assure equal bargaining strength; 24 to progressional Acts, see Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171
(1933); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J.
227 (1933).
19. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
20. The SEC's authority to enact the rule is derived from the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1982).
21. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729.
22. See, e.g., Superintendent ofIns., 404 U.S. at 12 (preserve integrity of markets); United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 532 (9th Cir. 1976);
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 140
(9th Cir. 1973) (protect purity of stock transactions), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 723
(1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 590 (5th Cir.) (prevent manipulation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801, 806, 808 (5th
Cir. 1970) (Section 10(b) intended to prevent market manipulation and aspires toward
free and open securities markets); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 212 (2d Cir.), modified
on other grounds on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)
(Section 10(b) intended to prevent manipulation and control of prices); Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961)
(keep jurisdictional means clear of manipulation); Hawes v. C.E. Cook & Co., 64 F.R.D.
22, 26 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (preserve integrity of securities markets), vacated on other grounds,
528 F.2d 329 (1976); Memorex Sees. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (preserve
integrity of the market); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afd, 494
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 220 (D. Del.
1960), aftd, 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); see also 5 JACOBS, supra
note 4, at § 6.02.
23. See, e.g., Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1362; Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 600 (investors should
have equal access; citing Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
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Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (investors
should have equal access; quoting Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833); Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 848, 851-52 (persons with inside information may not take advantage of it if they
know it is unavailable to the investing public; lOb-5 is implementation of Congress' purpose that all investors should have equal access to rewards of trading); Birdman v. ElectroCatheter Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (insider cannot use inside information to his advantage knowing
the public does not have access to it); see also Herpich, 430 F.2d at 806 (investors should
have information to make intelligent decisions); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lombard, C.J., dissenting) (investors should have
equal access; citing Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833; securities laws are designed to provide
equal access); Kahan, 424 F.2d at 173 (citing policy supported in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 212 (Section 10(b) intended to enable investors to make
proper appraisal of value of securities). But see Bloomenthal, From Bimbaum to Schoenbaum:
The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 351 n.79 (1969) (criticizing the
majority in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, for not considering why Congress failed to
provide an express remedy if it intended to place investors on an equal footing). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.03 (discussion of equal access to information as a policy).
24. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (federal courts have ceased to
look upon lOb-5 in narrow context of seller protection and have begun to see in it greater
purpose of equalization of bargaining position); Herpich, 430 F.2d at 806 (Congress intended to give investors a reasonable opportunity to make intelligent decisions); Mader v.
Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1968) (duty of disclosure is an attempt to provide some
degree of equalization of bargaining position; quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) with approval), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Schoenbaum, 405
F.2d at 212 (purpose of § 10(b) is to enable investors to make proper appraisal of value of
securities); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966) (Rule lOb-5 attempts
to equalize bargaining power between the individual and the corporation); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (purpose of lOb-5 is to put both buyer and seller in
an equal bargaining position), aj'g 227 F. Supp. 906, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (equalize bargaining position; quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 828-29), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965);
Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,779, at
90,820 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (equalization of bargaining position is "[a] common thread running through the fabric of the various securities cases"); Coyne v. MSL Indus., Inc., [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,451, at 99,284 (N.D. I11. 1976) (one
purpose of Rule is "to equalize the bargaining position of corporate insiders and uninformed minority shareholders"); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D. Cal.
1974) ("10b-5 has been utilized to inject some degree of bargaining equality into the
purchase and sale of securities"); Neidermeyer v. Niedermeyer, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,123, at 94,500 (D. Ore. 1973) (purpose of disclosure is to
equalize bargaining positions of parties); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D. Md.
1968) (equalize bargaining position; quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 828-29), modifed on other
grounds, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 820 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (equalize bargaining position; quoting Speed,
99 F. Supp. at 829), afd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 82829); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951) (duty of disclosure
is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position); Case Note,
Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5 Concepts of Materiality and Duty of Disclosure Expanded, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 483, 489 n.37 (1969) (equalization of bargaining position is policy
which cases state most clearly); cf.5 JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.04 (policy of equalization
of bargaining positions has begun to give way in recent years to other concepts).
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mote full disclosure; 25 to protect investors; 26 to assure fairness; 27 to
25. See, e.g., Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.) (underlying lOb-5
is Congressional intent that full disclosure will help to insure fair dealing in insider transactions), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir.
1972) (10(b) and lob-5 are designed principally to impose duty to disclose); In re Penn
Cent. Secs. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 869, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (10(b) and lob-5 were designed to
insure full disclosure), af'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); Abramson v. Nytronics Inc., 312
F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("lOb-5 is basically a disclosure provision"); Comment,
FederalSecurities Regulation-Insder Trading-Stock Options Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 54 IowA L.
REV. 635, 641-44 (1969) (distinct public interest in having information disclosed); Note,
Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure of After-Acquired Information. Strict Liability Under Rule
lOb-5?, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 554, 559 (1968) (full disclosure is goal of Exchange Act and
consequently of 1Ob-5); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X- OB-5, 40 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71 (1955) (purpose of Rule lOb-5 is to equalize
bargaining positions by encouraging disclosure); Note, Section 29(a) of the Secunhes Exchange
Act. A 'Legisative Chaperon'forRule 1Ob-5, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 499, 502 n.22 (1968) (disclosure now a primary goal of lOb-5, although not a main objective when promulgated);
Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur Expanding Concepts of CorporateDisclosure Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 43
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 425, 430 (1969) (10b-5 has become a disclosure rule to satisfy policy of
equalization of bargaining position although disclosure may not have been an original
objective of the Rule); Recent Decisions, Corporations-NneOf Eleven Offers, Directors, And
Employees Of Defendant CorporationHeld Not To Have Violated Section 10(b) And Rule lob-5 Of
The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 Since They Were Not In Possession Of Material Undisclosed
Information When They Traded In Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities, 55 ILL. B.J. 688, 703 (1967)
(lOb-5 intended to achieve prompt and complete disclosure of material facts); Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Defense of Unclean Hands Prevents Recoveg Under Section 10(B) and
Rule 1OB-5 by a Plaintiff Who Has Himself Traded on Inside Information, 44 TUL. L. REV. 618,
619 (1970) (fundamental purpose of Act and Rule lOb-5 to substitute philosophy of full
disclosure for philosophy of caveat emptor); f Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second
Round- Privity and State of Mind in Rule lb-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423,
443 (1968) (granting that disclosure is desirable but questioning whether liability should
arise out of failure to disclose); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur. Expanding Concepts of Corporate
Disclosure Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 655, 667-68 (1969) (imposition of
an affirmative duty of continuous disclosure is "a distinct possibility," but "one that will
certainly be unwelcomed in the business community"). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 4,
at § 6.05 (discussion of disclosure as a policy).
26, See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (primary
purpose is investor protection); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir.
1974) (fundamental purpose is investor protection), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (investor protection is a fundamental goal); Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d at 235 (investor protection is a fundamental policy);
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir. 1974) (intended to
protect creditors and stockholders), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Manor Drug Stores, 492
F.2d at 140; James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 1973) (investor protection is a principal purpose); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 363 (2d Cir.) (major Congressional policy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Travis v.
Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973); Haberman v. Murchison, 468
F.2d 1305, 1312 (2d Cir. 1972) (protect uninformed outsiders); Radiation Dynamics, Inc.
v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972); Hooper, 282 F.2d at 202 (10b-5 can rest on
either protection of investors or public interest); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 1048, 1054 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (protection of investors is of primary importance);
Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (purpose to protect public), modiftiedandaft'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp.,
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build investor confidence; 28 and to deter violations while compen274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (designed to protect buyers and sellers); Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (intent to protect investors); see also De Lancy, Rule lOb-.--A Recent rofile, 25 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1356 (1970) (courts
can decide securities issues by what they find necessary to protect investors); Comment,
Texas Gulf Sulphur. A Logical and Necessauy Extension ofjudicial Histoimy?, 17 U. KAN. L. REV.
263, 264 (1969) (section 10(b) intended by Congress to protect the investing public); Note,
Breach of Fiduciagy Duty Involving Full DirectorKnowledge Held lob-5 Violation, 1969 DUKE L.J.
383, 392 (protection of investing public is policy of lOb-5). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra
note 4, at § 6.06 (discussion of protection of investors as policy of lOb-5).
27. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1050 (7th Cir.)
(ultimate goal of securities regulations is to achieve fundamental fairness), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); Charney, 537 F.2d at 349 (means to prevent inequitable and unfair practices); Woodward, 522 F.2d at 91, 93 n.20 (promote climate of fair dealing); Merrill Lynch,
495 F.2d at 235, 240 (purpose to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to ensure
fair dealing); Arber, 490 F.2d at 418 (ensure fair dealing);James,483 F.2d at 948 (protect
traders from those who deal unfairly with them); Piper Aircrafl, 480 F.2d at 357 (insure
maintenance of fair and honest markets); Haberman, 468 F.2d at 1312; Radiation Dynamiis,
464 F.2d at 890-91 (goal of fundamental fairness); Herpich, 430 F.2d at 801, 806, 808
(designed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices in securities markets and foster climate of fair dealing); Crane Co., 419 F.2d at 793, 796 (referring to unfair practices by party
in a takeover fight and holding that fair dealing is a purpose of Exchange Act); Mader, 402
F.2d at 162 (quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. 808); Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847-48, 860
(Exchange Act intended to prevent inequitable and unfair practices by insiders and ensure
fairness in securities transactions); Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81, 86, 88
n.4, 89 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (basic purpose is to safeguard investors from devices adverse to fair
dealing); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591, 595 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (prevents inequitable
and unfair practices and ensures fairness and honesty); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 36, 46 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (10b-5 intended to bar use of devices alien to climate
of fair dealing); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(promote climate of fair dealing), aj'd,490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Baumel, 283 F. Supp. at 139 (prevent unfair advantage; quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp.
at 829, with approval); Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,243, at 97,141 (D.N.J. 1968) (disclosure laws enacted to promote
fair dealing); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D.
Ind. 1966) (promote fair play; quoting Kohler, 319 F.2d at 642, with approval), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970); List, 227 F. Supp. at 911 (prevent unfair advantage; quoting Speed, 99
F. Supp. 929, with approval); Kohler, 208 F. Supp. at 820 (prevent unfair advantage; quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 829, with approval), afd,319 F.2d at 638 (prevent unfair advantage; quoting Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 828, with approval); Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 828-29
(insider's duty of disclosure necessary to prevent taking unfair advantage of stockholders);
cf. De Lancey, supra note 26, at 1356 (10b-5 permits courts to decide cases on their idea of
fairness). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.07 (discussion of fairness as policy of
lOb-5).
28. See, e.g., Sargent, 492 F.2d at 760 (10b-5 policy to instill confidence in securities
market); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1969) (victimization of
brokers may impair public confidence in integrity and stability of market), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970); Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1010 (1966)
(investor confidence essential to promote private investment in public companies); Comment, Insider Trading on the Open Market. Nondisclosure and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 42 S. CAL. L.
REv. 309, 314 (1969) (foundation of any securities market is investor confidence). See
generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.08 (discussion of encouraging investor confidence as
policy of lOb-5).
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29
sating victims.

The purchase and sale of securities is in need of regulation for
the protection of investors. A major concern arises when information intended only for a corporate purpose, and not for personal
benefit, is used to the advantage of particular insiders.3 0 Section
10(b) was designed to create an efficient market system and to instill trust in the public that market prices were not controlled by
insiders. When large numbers of individuals and businesses survive on market transactions, the unwary public's fate should not
be unfairly determined by allowing a person in possession of mate3
rial nonpublic information to trade in the same market. '
29. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 324 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze,
J., concurring) (10b-5 encourages integrity in the marketplace and compensates victims of
violations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225, 227
(5th Cir. 1975) (important functions of lOb-5 are deterring violations and compensating
victims), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securties
Law FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnifcation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 660-61 (1972); Note, PrivateRightsfrom FederalStatutes: Toward
a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454, 467 n.67 (1968) (use the two policies to
determine when private right of action will lie and the action's parameters); cf Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,377, at 98,884 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("compensation, deterrence and prophylatic" functions of Rule lOb-5 must be applied carefully to protect legitimate business
activity); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 567 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (principle function of 10b-5 is deterrent rather than compensatory). See generally 5
JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.09 (discussion of deterrence versus compensation as policy of
IOb-5).
30. Insiders have traditionally included officers, directors, and controlling stockholders of corporations. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912. This list of insiders is not allinclusive, however. Id The SEC has taken the position that the purposes served by the
insider trading proscriptions are just as compelling where the corporate informant who
divulges confidential information is not of the highest rank, but "in a special relationship
with a company and privy to its internal affairs." In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,812, at 83,948 (1981) (quoting Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. at
912), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
31. To this end one of the major purposes of the securities acts is the prevention of
fraud, manipulation or deception in connection with securities transactions. Cady, Roberts
&Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910. Some commentators, however, argue that insiders should be able
to trade on the basis of nonpublic information if it would be lawfully available to others.
See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws,
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 359-65 (cited with approval in Diks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266). Another
commentator suggests that if the insider has a legitimate purpose in communicating the
information, then there should be no liability under Rule l0b-5 for such communication
because there is no fraudulent conduct. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 47 (cited in Dirks, 681
F.2d at 839 n.18). Others contend that economic considerations do not justify restrictions
on insider trading because such trading increases the information flow to the market and
thereby improves market efficiency. Heller, supra note 3, at 522 n. 10.
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III.

THE LAW BEFORE DIRKS

Before analyzing the conclusions of the Dirks decision, it is helpful to thoroughly examine the principal issues that the courts and
the SEC focused on prior to Dirks.
A.

Scope of Secion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5

The Supreme Court has construed section 10(b) to bar the use
of deceptive devices in the purchase or sale of securities.3 2 Although section 10(b) has been described as a catchall provision in
the federal securities laws, 33 the Court has made clear that "what
it catches must be fraud. ' 34 There is a violation of Rule 10b-5
whenever an insider fraudulently trades on material nonpublic information for personal gain.3 5 Fraud includes "all acts, omissions
and concealments that involve a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or
by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. ' 36 Rule 10b-5 does not encompass valid trading on rumors
37
or analysis of publicly available information.
B.

The F'duciar Duty as a Requisitefor Rule lOb-5 Liabih'ty

Before 1980, the justification for finding a violation of Rule 10b5 was premised on the idea that the rule "is based in policy on the
justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access
32. Supenntendent ofIns., 404 U.S. at 12.
33. Texas Cuf/Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 n.9; see also supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
34. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). Only conduct involving
manipulation or deception is reached by Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977). In the following cases courts have found a
particular action one of "deception": Affliated Ute Citirens, 406 U.S. 128 (misstatements of
material fact used by hank employees in position of market maker to acquire stock at less
than fair value); Superintendent ofIns., 404 U.S. at 9 (seller of bonds was tricked into believing that it would receive the proceeds); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (scheme of market manipulation and
merger on unfair terms, one element was misrepresentation); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d
819 (5th Cir. 1970) (derivative suit alleging that corporate officers used misleading proxy
materials and other reports to deceive stockholders); Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 475 n. 15.
35. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3266 (1983).
36. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 194. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that even the potential for fraudulent abuse is enough to cause a purchase or sale of
a security to fall within the Securities Exchange Act. Id.at 200.
37. See Heller, supra note 3, at 528-29.
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to material information. ' 38 In 1980, however, the Court held in
Chiarella v. UnitedState3 9 that liability under Rule 10b-5 could not
simply turn on whether the defendant knew that other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the same
information. Chiarella involved an employee of a financial printer
who set type for documents to be used in connection with tender
offers. Because of his work, Chiarella was able to learn which companies were about to be the targets of tender offers at above-market prices. He would buy stock in the target companies before the
offers were announced and sell afterwards at a profit. Chiarella
was charged with violating a number of the securities laws, including section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 40 In reversing Chiarella's conviction, the Supreme Court limited the scope of liability by
holding that an actor can violate Rule 10b-5 only if he is under a
legal duty to disclose the material information prior to consummation of the securities transaction. 41 If the defendant is neither an
insider nor a fiduciary, there is no obligation to reveal material
facts.

42

The Chiarella Court initiated its probe into the legal obligation
requirement by examining two principal elements of duty considered by the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.43 In Cady, Roberts &
Co., the SEC held that an insider holding material undisclosed information is required to either abstain from trading or adequately
disclose the information prior to such trading. 44 This duty arose
from "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose,
and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take ad'45
vantage of that information by trading without disclosure.
The Chiarella Court refined the principles enunciated in Cady,
Roberts & Co. by resolving that the duty to disclose would arise only
where one party had information that another party was "entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them."'46 After determining that Chiarella
38.

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.

39.

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at
Id at
Id at
Id. at

44.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.

222-24.
232-35.
229.
226-29 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907).

45. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912).
46. Id at 228; see Pitt, Chiarella Court. Limits on Novel lOb-5 Actions, Legal Times of
Wash., Mar. 31, 1980, at 12, col. 1; Wang, supra note 15, at 1270-71.
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was neither an agent for the sellers of the target companies' securities, a fiduciary, nor a person in whom the sellers had placed their
was not bound
trust and confidence, the Court held that Chiarella
47
by the disclosure duty required by Rule

C

lOb-5.

Tippee Liabi'lty

In cases prior to Chiarella, courts and the SEC focused on the
tippee as the primary or coequal wrongdoer. 48 A tippee is one who
receives confidential corporate information from an insider. 49 An
insider is one who obtains inside information in his business capacity and has a legitimate business reason for knowing the information. 50 Unlike an insider, a tippee neither obtains inside
information in a business capacity nor has a legitimate business
reason for knowing it. 5 I Although insiders and tippees obtain their

information differently, both are subject to the same duties under
Rule lOb-5. To be held liable, a tippee must know or have reason
to know that his inside information was obtained improperly, by
52
selective revelation or otherwise.
Cady, Roberts & Co. was a tippee case. 53 A partner of Cady, Rob47. 445 U.S. at 231-37.
48. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 25. See generally 5B JACOBS, supra note 4, at §§ 162168 (discussion of tipping).
49. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 24.
50. See 5A JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 66.02(a) (discussing insiders).
51. Id
52. In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 644 (1971); accord Barnett,
Neithera Tipper Nor a Toppee Be, 8 Hous. L. REV. 278, 285, 290-91 (1970) (unequal access);
Bromberg, The Law of Corporate Information, FIN. ANALYSTS J. Mar.-Apr. 1969, at 26, 27
(discussing Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833; concluding that to violate lOb-5, tippee must
have knowledge that information comes from a company source); Painter, Rule 10b-5: The
Recodifzcation Thicket, 45 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 699, 708 (1971) (actual or constructive knowledge that information came from a company source or from an insider); Weeks & McCormick, Broker-Dealer Disclosure of CorporateInside Information, 18 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 560
(1969) (tippee must know, actually or constructively, that information came from a company source); Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule 10b-5 - The Tipee at
Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 545, 550, 555-59 (1972) (constructive knowledge required for
insiders; actual knowledge required for tippees and presumptions); Note, Secur'ties Law.-Rule lOb-5-PersonsNot Corporate Insiders Censuredfor Use of Non-PubiWc Information, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 994 (discussing SEC's scienter requirement established in Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 644); see alsoJACOBS, supra note 4, at § 66.02(a) n.32; infra notes 59,
92.
Whether or not a person is an insider or a tippee under these tests is a question of fact
which must be determined by applying an objective standard on a case by case basis.
Kohler, 319 F.2d at 637-38; see also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Insider Indemnifisation and the Supremacy Clause: The Three Faces of Fraud,63 Nw. U.L. REV.
523, 537 n.81 (1968).
53. 40 S.E.C. 907.
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erts & Co., a registered brokerage firm, was informed of a dividend
reduction by an associate of the firm who was also a director of the
issuer of the security. 54 The partner knew that the information
had not been released to the public, yet he executed orders for the
sale of shares of the securities for his discretionary accounts. 55 The
SEC held that these actions violated Rule lOb-5. 56 The Commission decreed that buyers who purchase stock from persons having
the responsibilities of an insider should have the same protection
provided by disclosure as their sellers did.5 7 Therefore, liability

must be extended to the tippee to protect both buyers and sellers. 58
The ChiarellaCourt incorporated the element of legal duty into
tippee liability. The Court stated that tippees of corporate insiders
who trade on the inside information violate section 10(b) "because
they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information
that they know . . .or should know came from a corporate in-

sider." 59 The SEC must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper
had a special relationship to the issuer, and breached his duty to
keep the information secret.60 The ChiarellaCourt reasoned that a
tippee's duty "aris[es] from his role as a participant after the fact
61
in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.
54. Id. at 908.
55. Id at 908-09, 912.
56. Id at 911.
57. Id at 912.
58. Id at 913.
59. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. Negligence has now been rejected as a standard for private
damage actions. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (plaintiff must prove
scienter in private damage action; negligence is insufficient in lOb-5 private damage suits);
see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. Something more than having "reason to
know" may therefore be required. The court in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aftd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), used
the "reason to know" test, although it rejected negligence as a standard of care for the
defendants. Id at 273, 279. The court of appeals affirmed the district court in Shapiro,
holding that the tippees violated lOb-5 because they "knew or should have known of the
confidental source." 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974).
If the "know or reason to know" approach is used, the question arises whether the
insider or tippee should be used as a standard to determine if he had reason to know (a
subjective approach) or whether a fictional reasonable man should be employed (an objective approach). See Fisher, 266 F. Supp. at 188 (promoting subjective standard). See generally 5A JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 68 (discussion of standard of conduct, scienter,
negligence and due diligence); 5B JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 167, 167 n.15 (discussion of
liability of tippers).
60. See Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 651 (Smith, Comm'r, concurring).
61. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
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IV.

THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF DIRKS

Raymond L. Dirks was a securities broker who specialized in
insurance stock at a New York brokerage firm. Dirks dealt exclusively with institutional clients that he knew had invested or might
be interested in investing in insurance company stocks. 6 2 Dirks
was apparently highly respected and well known within the investment community for his knowledge of insurance companies and
his willingness to go beyond mere financial data in evaluating
63
investments.
On March 6, 1973, Dirks received a telephone call from Ronald
Secrist, a former employee of Equity Funding Corporation of
America (Equity Funding).64 Equity Funding was a substantially
65
diversified company, engaged primarily in selling life insurance.
Secrist made a number of detailed allegations about Equity Funding.66 He reported foremost that the company had created at least
67
40,000 fictitious life insurance policies to inflate its sales figures.
The fictitious policies represented approximately one-third of Equity Funding's outstanding life insurance business.6 8
Secrist informed Dirks that the regulatory agencies had failed to
69
act on similar charges made by other Equity Funding employees.
62. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3256 (1983). The facts stated here are taken from
more detailed statements set forth in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission, In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, at 83,939
(1981) and the majority opinion by Judge Wright in the court of appeals decision in Dirks
v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 828-33 (D.D.C. 1982).
63. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,941.
64. Id
65. "[Equity Funding] conducted its operations through a number of subsidiaries,
which included several life insurance companies, broker-dealers, investment advisors and a
savings and loan association." Id
82,812, at 83,941 n.4.
66. 681 F.2d at 829-30. Secrist mainly reported that one of Security Funding's subsidiaries had created false insurance policies and records to inflate sales figures. Secrist
also alleged that the company was selling partnerships in nonexistent real estate; that its
top officers had Mafia connections which they used to threaten the lives of employees who
objected to the fabrications; and that the accounting firm of Haskins & Sells had dropped
the Equity Funding account out of disagreement with the company's business practices.
Id Through one informant, Dirks later learned that Secrist's allegations about Haskins &
Sells were untrue. The accounting firm had lost Equity Funding's business to a competitor and would have been glad to get it back. Id at 829.
67. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,941. "To carry out its
scheme,. . . [Equity Funding] created supporting files, medical records and death certificates for non-existent policyholders, bribed and intimidated some of its auditors and state
examiners, and falisfied its financial records to show the receipt and dispostion of nonexistent premiums." Id (footnote omitted).
68. Id. 82,812, at 83,942.
69. Id.
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He encouraged Dirks to verify the fraud and publicly disclose it.
Secrist provided Dirks with names of present and former Equity
Funding employees who would corroborate his charges. Secrist
also give Dirks permission to disclose his allegations to the Wall
Street Journal70
Believing that Secrist was not merely a vindictive former employee, Dirks decided to investigate Secrist's accusations. 7' First,
Dirks examined public data regarding Equity Funding's insurance
sales and found nothing that would confirm or refute that the
company was fabricating policies. 72 He then contacted others in
the investment community to determine if they knew anything
that could prove or disprove the rumors. 73 This search was generally fruitless. Dirks also telephoned Equity Funding's chairperson,
who denied that there was any fraud and invited Dirks to visit the
company's headquarters in Los Angeles. 74 Finally, on March 19,
Dirks flew to Los Angeles to visit with other former Equity Funding employees. 75 Several sources confirmed the allegations about
inflated and phony insurance sales. Another admitted that he had
been involved in altering the company's insurance-in-force
76
figures.
While in Los Angeles, Dirks met with Equity Funding officers
who continued to deny that there was anything amiss in the company. 77 Dirks also frequently visited with William Blundell, the
Wall StreetJournal'sLos Angeles bureau chief. Dirks was unsuccessful at convincing Blundell to write a story on the allegations of
fraud at Equity Funding. 78 Yet on March 26, Blundell contacted
the SEC's Los Angeles office and repeated what Dirks had been
79
telling him. The SEC took no immediate action.
Meanwhile, beginning on March 12, Dirks relayed Secrist's alle70. 681 F.2d at 832 n.6. "On March 7, 1973, before meeting with Dirks, Secrist told
his whole story to people at the New York State Insurance Commissioner's Office." Id.; see
also [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 82,812, at 83,942 n.8.
71. 681 F.2d at 830.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id
76. Dirks obtained the names of these sources from Secrist and Patrick Hopper, a
former vice president of Equity Funding at the time Dirks met with him. It was Hopper
who suggested to Secrist that he tell his story to Dirks after Secrist lost his job. Id
77. Id
78. Blundell was afraid that publishing such damaging rumors supported only by
hearsay from former employees might be libelous. Id at 831-32.
79. Id at 832.
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gations against Equity Funding to a number of his clients and
other investors and brokers who had an interest in Equity Funding.80 Several of his listeners subsequently sold large blocks of Equity Funding stock.81 In less than two weeks from the time Dirks
began investigating and spreading word of Secrist's allegations, the
trading price of Equity Funding shares fell from twenty-six dollars
to less than fifteen dollars.8 2 The SEC finally halted trading in the
stock on March 28.83

On April 2, the SEC filed a complaint against Equity Funding
and a front-page story written by Blundell was published in the
Wall Street Journal.84 Equity Funding immediately went into receivership. 85 Dirks, although neither he nor his firm ever owned or
traded any Equity Funding stock, became the object of an SEC
86
disciplinary proceeding.
After applying the well-established rules from Cad, Roberts &
88 to non-trading security
Co.8 7 and Chiarella
brokers who tip mate8
9
rial nonpublic securities information, the SEC concluded that
80. This was at least a week before Dirks flew to Los Angeles to confirm Secrist's
allegations with other sources. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 82,812, at
83,942.
81. Dirks reported the full allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors,
Inc., which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of Equity securities.
Boston Company directed business to Delafield Childs, the brokerage where Dirks worked,
that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions. 103 S. Ct. at 3269 & n.4. On
March 26, Dirks informed the investment advisor firm John Bristol & Co., Inc. that if he
were in Bristol's position, he would sell the stock that its clients held in Equity Funding
securities. Bristol immediately sold all of its Equity Funding holdings for over $8 million.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,944.
82. 681 F.2d at 832.
83. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,944.
84. Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds: Some Assets Missing, Insurance Called Bogus at Equity
Funding Life, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6, 14, col. 5.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3269.
86. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,939.
87. 40 S.E.C. 907, 910-17 (1961) (tippees have same duty as insiders to abstain or
disclose material, nonpublic information). See generaly supra notes 43-61 (discussing Cady,
Roberts & Co. and tippee liability).
88. 445 U.S. at 225-30 (insiders and tippees violate federal securities law when they
hold a fiduciary duty to the shareholders and trade on material, nonpublic information
without first disclosing it). See generally supra notes 39-61 (discussing Chiarella and tippee
liability).
89. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 82,812, at 83,945. The Commission
admitted that a security analyst brings inherent value to the entire market. "[M]arket
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by such initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." Id
Nevertheless, the SEC emphasized the distinction between its long-accepted practice of
allowing analysts to investigate immaterial, nonpublic inside information to enhance their
competitive advantage, and a Dirks situation where the original accusations from the in-
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Raymond Dirks willfully aided and abetted violations of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 90 The Commission determined that Dirks
knew that the information he obtained was confidential and nonpublic.9 1 In addition, the Commission found that Dirks knew or
should have known by discussing the information with certain investment advisors that trading would probably result from his disclosure.9 2 Only after ruling that Dirks violated the law did the
sider were simply confirmed by the other inside sources. Id at 83,947. The SEC believed
that under these circumstances, its decision would not discourage analysts from engaging
in the legitimate and desirable function of seeking out corporate information. Id. at
83,950. The Commission stated that it did "not seek in any way to chill the investigation
of rumors concerning a particular company." Id.
90. Set 681 F.2d at 844 (discussion of aiding and abetting principles in conjunction
with Rule lOb-5). The SEC also ruled that Dirks violated section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 because the securities transaction at issue was a sale. [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,945 n.20, 83,950. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transporation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q(a) (1982). But see Heller, supra note 3, at 552 (suggesting "[t]he conclusion
that Dirks was an 'aider and abettor' must be seriously questioned after the decision in
Chiarela"). Heller quotes former SEC general counsel Harvey Pitt: "Thus, Chiarella certainly suggests that in the absence of some affrmat'e andIpreex'st'ng reatz nsh'p between an
alleged aider and abettor and those who are allegedly injured by the aider and abettor's
silence or inaction, Rule lOb-5 liability simply may not exist." Id at 552 (quoting Pitt,
supra note 46, at 22, col. 4) (emphasis in Heller original).
91. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,948-49.
The SEC addressed five major issues in Dirks. Id $ 82,812, at 83,945-50. First, the
Commission ruled that the information Dirks disseminated was material because there
was a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to [act].
... Id at 83,946 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The Commission also held that the information Dirks received was
inside information. A leak by a top official was not required. It was sufficient that Secrist
was "in a special relationship with. . . [Equity Funding] and privy to its internal affairs."
Id 1 82,812, at 83,948 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912). The SEC then determined that Dirks' experience and his investigation of Equity Funding led to the reasonable conclusion that he knew the information was not generally available. Id
82,812, at
83,948-49. The Commission then concluded that due to Dirks' experience, he had reason
to know that trading would result from his disclosure. ld. 82,812, at 83,949. Finally, the
SEC determined that Dirks acted with a conscious intent to invoke trading by disseminating the material, nonpublic information. Id.
83,949-50 (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)).
92. See id. $ 82,812, at 83,949. In order for a defendant to be liable under Rule lOb-5
he must act with scienter or intent. Scienter is a mental state embracing an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst & Erast, 425 U.S. at 193 & n. 12. It is not enough
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SEC acknowledge the important role he had played in bringing
the fraud to light and reduce his sixty-day suspension, imposed by
the administrative law judge, to censure. 93
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
SEC's judgment, 94 stating that security advisors associated with
registered brokers must respect the disclose-or-refrain obligations
of their corporate sources. 95 Reasoning that obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large, 96 the
court concluded that Dirks inherited his informants' disclose-orrefrain obligation. 9 7 A breach by insiders was not necessary to
make their tippees answerable for acts that would have constituted
a breach had they been committed by the insiders. 98
that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be found
only where there is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." 103 S. Ct. at 3265 n.23
(quoting Emst & Erst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12).
93. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
82,812, at 83,950.
94. 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
95. Id at 837; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the abstain-ordisclose rule).
After reviewing a number of cases to determine the applicability of the duty to disclose-or-refrain under lOb-5, the majority concluded that variants of two general theories,
the "fiduciary" and the "information" theories, had most often triggered a duty to disclose
or refrain from trading. 681 F.2d at 834-35. The court asserted that the holding in
Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222 (1980), where the Supreme Court sought to resolve the tension between these two theories, was that a duty to disclose arose from a
fiduciary duty, not simply from possession of material, nonpublic information. Id. at 83637 (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235). The fiduciary theory defines a fraudulent transaction as one where traders or their informants profit at the expense or exclusion of those
who have placed trust in them. 681 F.2d at 835. The information theory espouses that all
investors should have equal access to information that a reasonable investor would consider material to investment decisions. Securities transactions where only one party had
an opportunity to learn and did learn such material information are considered inherently
unfair. Id Tension between the two theories derives in large part from the conflict between the two major ideals of the federal securities laws-fairness to all investors and
efficient markets for capital. See Brudney, supra note 31, at 333-39.
96. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
97. 681 F.2d at 839. The court of appeals announced that Dirks also had obligations
to the SEC and the public independent of any obligations he derived from Secrist's duties.
Id at 840. The court stated that Rule lob-5 should operate in conjunction with the ethical duty implied by the other provisions of the securities laws to forbid brokers, and those
who obtain information from them, from trading in unsound or fraudulent securities without first disclosing the material information they possess. Id at 842.
98. Id at 839 n. 16.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

A.

The Majority Opini'on

Confronted with the issue whether Dirks violated the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, the Supreme Court, by a
six to three margin, reversed the court of appeals and found Dirks
not guilty on all charges. 9 9 Justice Powell, in the majority opinion,
first discussed three notions that different adjudicative bodies had
found to be requisites for a Rule 10b-5 violation: 1) the existence
of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose; 2) a duty to disclose
arising from the existence of a fiduciary relationship; and 3) manipulation or deception."t° The Court reiterated that "a duty to
disclose arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not

merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market." 10' In applying the rule to the situation at
hand, Justice Powell noted that to impose a duty to disclose or
abstain solely because a person knowingly received material nonpublic information from an insider and traded on it could have an
02
inhibiting influence on the role of market advisors. 1
As he focused on Dirks' potential liability as a tippee, Justice
Powell recognized the need for restrictions on some tippee trading.'0 3 He stated that some tippees must assume an insider's duty
to the shareholders when inside information has been made available to them improperly. 10 4 Therefore, to determine whether a
tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary
to determine whether the insider's tip constituted a breach of the
insider's fiduciary duty. 0 5 In essence, a tippee's duty is derived
from a breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty.
The Court stressed that not all disclosures of confidential corporate information would violate the duty insiders owe to sharehold99. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983).
100. Id at 3260-61.
101. Id at 3263 (quoting from Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 n.14
(1980)).
102. Id The SEC itself recognized that market analysts are necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. Id;In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,812, at 83,945 (1981).
103. The Court cited 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) for the proposition that it is unlawful to do
indirectly by means of any other person any act made unlawful'by the federal securities
laws. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
104. Id at 3264.
105. Id at 3265.
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ers. 10 6 Whether disclosure is a breach of duty depends on the

purpose of the disclosure. Justice Powell declared that a purpose
of the securities laws was to eliminate the use of inside information
for personal gain.10 7 Based on this premise, the Court devised the
personal benefit requirement. 108 The majority pronounced, "The
test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has
been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by
the insider, there is no derivative breach."' 10 9
The SEC argued that if liability was not imposed regardless of
whether information was initially disclosed for a proper purpose,
parties might side-step insider trading liability by fabricating business justifications for transmitting information." l0 Justice Powell
responded, "We think the SEC is unduly concerned.""' The
Court held that to determine whether a disclosure is fraudulent,
courts must first examine "whether there has been a breach of
duty by the insider." 1 2 Courts could resolve this issue by focusing
on an objective determination' 13 of whether the insider directly or
indirectly benefitted from the disclosure.' 14 The Court advised
that factors such as monetary or reputational gains should be considered.' 15 Only if the insider's personal benefit was established
would a tippee inherit a duty to disclose or abstain.
The SEC argued that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5 either in the
capacity of an insider or as a tippee."

6

In response to this argu-

ment, the majority first determined that Dirks was not an insider
since he had no pre-existing duty to Equity Funding's shareholders
and took no action that induced the shareholders or officers of Eq106. Id
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id The Court cited Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1980), as an example of a case turning on a determination that the disclosure did not
impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside information. 103 S. Ct. at 3265
n.22.
110.

Id

111.

Id

112. Id at 3266.
113. Id Contra id at 3270 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's personal benefit requirement imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty
owed by insiders to shareholders).
114. Id at 3266.
115.

Id

116. Id at 3262, 3266.
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uity Funding to repose trust in him. 1 7 Justice Powell then asserted that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees
violated their duty to the corporation's shareholders. The tippers
received neither monetary nor personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets. They did not intend to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks, nor to deceive or defraud anyone with
the disclosed information. "' The Court concluded that in the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was
no derivative breach by Dirks. Therefore, Dirks was not liable as a
tippee for any alleged violations of Rule lOb-5.119
B.

The Dissent

Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun reproached the majority for the Dirks ruling and previous decisions that frustrated the
Congressional intent behind the securities laws. 20 The dissent argued that Congress intended the securities laws to be interpreted
flexibly to protect investors and to regulate deceptive practices detrimental to their interests.' 2' The majority's new personal benefit
requirement, however, impeded the goals of 10b-5 by imposing a
"special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty
doctrine."1

22

Except for the personal benefit requirement, Justice Blackmun
followed and accepted much of the majority's legal analysis. The
dissent reasoned that Secrist stood in a fiduciary relationship with
the shareholders 23 and that corporate insiders have a duty to disclose or abstain from trading. 24 Both opinions acknowledged that
Secrist could not do through others what he was prohibited from
doing personally. 25 The dissent interpreted Secrist's exploits to
fall within this latter prohibition: Secrist intentionally used Dirks
as a conduit to injure Equity Funding shareholders to whom Secrist owed a duty to disclose. 26 The dissent concluded that, ac117. Id at 3267.
118. Id. at 3267 n.27.
119. See id at 3268 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
120. Id
121. d. at 3268 n.I (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1934) and referring inter a/la to Chiarela).
122. Id. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. Compare id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) with id at 3260.
125. Compare id at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) with id. at 3263. See also Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).
126. 103 S. Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cording to the majority's view of tippee liability 2 7 without the
personal benefit requirement, Dirks' knowledge of Secrist's breach
28
made him liable as a participant in the breach.
The dissent strongly opposed the majority's conclusion that personal gain is required for lOb-5 liability. 29 Justice Blackmun argued that whether the corporate insider benefitted from the
transaction does not affect the shareholder's position.13 0 The
13
shareholder loses regardless of the insider's motivation. '
Justice Blackmun also disagreed in principle with the Court's
requirement of an improper motive. He noted the misplaced emphasis of the majority's "new, subjective limitation on the scope of
the duty owed by insiders to shareholders,"'' 32 stating that the
Court had confused one of the evils the securities laws were intended to prevent with the nature of the insider trading duty itself.' 33 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the second element of
the Cady, Roberts & Co.' 34 obligation to abstain-or-disclose is "the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing." 1 35 Justice Blackmun indicated that this second element identified the harm that the duty to disclose was designed to
protect against. Enrichment of the insider is not part of the nature
36
of the duty. It is only one of the evils the duty aims to prevent.
Justice Blackmun urged that the disclosure duty was aimed not at
127. Id. at 3270 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both the majority and the dissent
cited the rule espoused in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971). 103
S. Ct. at 3264 n. 19, 3270 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The SEC in Investors Management
Co. held that one factor of tippee liability was that the "tippee knew or had reason to
know that [the information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C. at 641; see also supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (discussion of majority's use of tippee liability rule).
128. Justice Blackmun interpreted the Court's opinion to impose liability on tippees
when the tippee "knows or has reason to know that the information is material and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of a duty by selective revelation or otherwise."

Id. at 3270 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 641;
supra note 125.
129. 103 S. Ct. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Langevoort, supra note 2, at 2
n.5, 28 n. 1ll.

130. 103 S. Ct. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131.

Id.

132. Id at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 3271 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134.

40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

135.

103 S. Ct. at 3270 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40

S.E.C. at 912).
136. Id at 3271 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the insider's personal gain, but at the misuse of nonpublic informa13 7
tion and its subsequent effect on shareholders.
In support of its conclusion that personal gain is not an element
of the breach of duty, the dissent compared Dirks to the Court's
holding in Mosser v. Darrow.138 In Mosser, a reorganization trustee
was held liable for the graft of two employees he had hired to provide services for the trust even though the trustee received no personal gain.' 39 The Mosser Court noted that although the trustee's
intentions were selfless, 140 his motives were irrelevant.' 4 ' The Dirks
dissent concluded, "Mosser demonstrates . . . [that] the breach

consists in taking action disadvantageous to the person to whom
one owes a duty."' 42 Thus, by ignoring the harm done to Equity
Funding shareholders and imposing a personal benefit requirement, the majority's ruling conflicted with Mosser.143
The dissent recognized that Secrist and Dirks played substantial
roles in exposing the Equity Funding fraud. 44 It also admitted
that the SEC had not provided much practical guidance on the
145
procedures necessary to meet the duty to abstain or disclose.
The dissent determined, however, that the means Secrist chose
were not laudable and that Dirks and his clients should not have
profited from the information they obtained from Secrist. 14 6 The
dissent concluded that, as a citizen, Dirks had at least an ethical
obligation to report the information to the proper authorities
147
before trading or disclosing such information to clients.

VI.

ANALYSIS OF DIRKS AND THE PERSONAL BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT

A.

Vah'dit of the Decziion

The results achieved in Dirks are commendable for a number of
reasons. Primarily, the Dirks decision is backed by precedent and
137. Id at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. 341 U.S. 267 (1951); Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3271-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. 341 U.S. at 275. Mosser had allowed the employees to trade in the subsidiary's
securities. The employees subsequently turned their inside positions into substantial profits at the expense of the trust and holders of the companies' securities. Id at 269-70.
140. Id at 275.
141. ld at 271-72.
142. 103 S.Ct. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id
144. Id at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145.

Id

146. Id
147. Id.
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the realities of the securities exchange market. Throughout the
opinion, the Dirks Court followed the directives established in its
earlier decisions. The Court followed Chiarella by examining
whether Dirks had a fiduciary duty to the stockholders of Equity
Funding. 4 1 The Court also followed precedent and Congressional
intent by holding that fraud must be present to establish 10b-5
liability. 149
By imposing the personal benefit requirement, the Court upheld
prior decisions, recognized the aims of lOb-5, and accepted the
"win-lose" reality of the securities market. The focal point of Congressional intent and judicial interpretaton of section 10b-5 is on
fraudulent practice and unfair personal benefit to the insider-not
the loss to an unsuccessful investor. In addition, the Dirks decision
acknowledges the vulnerable position of brokers, investors, and insiders by refusing to impose liability for failure to disclose where
the SEC has failed to promulgate guidelines for disclosure.
The Dirks majority explicitly confirmed the Chiare/la Court's
holding' 50 that there is no duty to disclose where a person who has
traded on inside information is not a fiduciary or a person in
whom traders of securities had placed their trust and confidence. 51 If the Dirks Court had not required a fiduciary relationship before imposing 10b-5 liability, it would have departed
radically from the established doctrine that a duty arises from a
specific relationship between two parties. The Court could not go
as far as to impose a duty on everyone who trades in securities to
refrain from trading when they receive material nonpublic information.152 The Chiarella Court stated that a broad duty between
all participants in market transactions to forego actions based on
material nonpublic information should not be imposed absent
some explicit evidence of Congressional intent. 5 3 In Chiarella,the
Court determined that no evidence of a broad duty emerged from
the language or legislative history of section 10(b), nor had Congress or the SEC ever adopted a parity-of-information rule.

54

Dirks follows Chiarellaand an inference from Congress, ruling that
148.
149.
(1977)).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id at 3261-63; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
103 S. Ct. at 3261 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
103 S.Ct. at 3261.
Id
445 U.S at 234-35.

Id.
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a fiduciary relationship must be identified before further scrutiny
of fraudulent trading practices under Rule lOb-5 is undertaken.
The Court's decision in Dirks is also in accordance with Congress' intent that the securities provisions prohibit only "those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated
to fulfill no useful function.' 55 The Dirks decision recognizes, consistent with this Congressional mandate and the Court's earlier decisions, 156 that there must be fraud to constitute a violation of Rule
10b-5.' 57 Dirks' actions were not fraudulent. Rather, they served
to expose fraud on the part of Equity Funding. The SEC believed
that Dirks' efforts in bringing Equity Funding's massive fraud to
light, including reporting the allegations to Equity Funding's auditors and a Wall Street Journal reporter, were commendable
enough to be grounds to reduce a sixty-day suspension to a mere
imposition of censure. 158 The court of appeals shared the view
that thanks largely to Dirks, one of the most infamous frauds in
recent memory was uncovered and exposed. 59 Unquestionably,
Secrist and Dirks achieved legitimate objectives by revealing a major fraud in a short span of time while the SEC repeatedly missed
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding. 1 0
The new personal benefit requirement is mandated by prior judicial interpretation and the realities of the exchange market. The
Dirks Court cited the standard "identified by the SEC itself in
155. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting from S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
156. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 235; see also Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472; Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
157. 103 S. Ct. at 3261; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
158. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, 83,950
(1981); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
159. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.D.C. 1982).
160. Id at 832 n.6. The SEC had a history of failing to act promptly in the Equity
Funding case. In 1971, the SEC was approached by an Equity Funding employee who
reported questionable accounting practices at Equity Funding. The SEC performed a
cursory investigation and took no further action. After Secrist's charges were relayed to
the California Insurance Department, a California official expressed an interest in conducting a full inspection of Equity Funding and asked for help from the SEC. The SEC
staff attorney stated that similar allegations had been made about the company before by
disgruntled employees. He recommended "delaying any type of inspection of the Equity
Funding operations until next year when more personnel are available." Id; cf [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 82,812, at 83,944 n.18 (SEC claimed that full parameters of the Equity Funding fraud were not revealed until after Dirks had disseminated the information). For other examples of the SEC failing to enforce securities laws,
see Hudson, supra note 14, at 36, col. 3.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/1

26

Lansing and Schoon: Rule 10B-5 and the Personal Benefit Requirement: Dirks v. Securit
19851

INSIDER TRADING

Cady, Roberts & Co.. a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate 'use of inside information for personal advantage.' ",161 Section 10(b) guarantees that corporate insiders will not benefit
personally through fraudulent use of material nonpublic information. 62 The statute focuses on the benefit to the insider, rather
than the loss to the investor. Thus the language of the statute
commands that sensibility replace pity in the minds of courts when
market "losers" bring charges of 10b-5 violations. As market values fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there are always "winners" and "losers." There
were indeed some "losers" as a result of Secrist's and Dirks' disclo1 63
sures, but those who "lost" were not necessarily defrauded.
The dissenters in Dirks, analogizing its facts to those in Mosser v.
Darrow,164 argued that the personal gain requirement conflicted
with precedent and was not an element of Rule 10b-5.16 5 Although the reorganization trustee in Mosser received no personal
gain, he was held liable for the graft of two employees he had
hired to provide services for the trust. 166 The dissent's effort to
reach the same result in Dirks as in Mosser fails for several reasons.
There was no similarity in the responsibilities owed by the defendants to the injured parties in each case. Secrist, not Dirks, most
closely mirrored the position of the defendant-trustee in Mosser,
yet the SEC never brought charges against Secrist. Furthermore,
the Mosser trustee owed the highest fiduciary duty to the trust and
beneficiaries, 6 7 while Dirks had no fiduciary relationship with Equity Funding or any of the purchasers of the company's securities.' 68 The Court in Mosser did not have to reach the question of
161. 103 S. Ct. at 3265 (quoting Cad, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15). The Court
also cited Brudney, supra note 31, in support of its personal benefit requirement. 103 S. Ct.
at 3266. But see supra note 113; infra note 165 and accompanying text (noting dissent's
claim that the requirement is unprecedented).
162. See 103 S. Ct. at 3265; Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
163. 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.27. Although the dissent was disturbed that all shareholders
lost in some respect since the price of Equity Funding shares dropped from $26 to $15
during the time that Dirks investigated Equity Funding and informed clients of his findings, the majority reiterated that there may be no clear causal connection between inside
trading and outsiders' losses. Id
164. 341 U.S. 267 (1951); see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
165. Id at 3271-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. 341 U.S. at 275. Mosser had allowed the employees to continue to trade in the
subsidiaries' securities. The employees subsequently turned their inside positions into substantial profits at the expense of the trust and holders of the company's securities. Id at
269-70.
167. Id at 271.
168. 103 S. Ct. at 3266-67.
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the insider's "personal gain" because the trustee's breach of duty
was self-evident.
A final reason for satisfaction with the outcome in Dirks is that
Dirks had no definitive guidance from the law regarding how, or
to whom, he was to disclose the evidence of Equity Funding's
fraud without the threat of reprisal from the SEC. The dissent
acknowledged that while persons with inside information are instructed not to trade on that information unless they disclose, the
SEC has failed to advise individuals how to disclose.1 69 The Commission requires that information become public, but there is no
regulation that gives notice as to when that requirement is satisfied. Until adequate standards are established by which an individual can reasonably determine whether information has become
public or not, individuals in a Dirks-type dilemma should be immune from Rule lOb-5 liability.
The Dirks decision is praiseworthy in general because it helps to
clarify some uncertainty surrounding lOb-5 liability. By following
precedent, construing Congressional language and recognizing the
realities of the exchange market and the role of the SEC, the Court
provides insight on how brokers, investors and insiders should conduct their business.
B.

Examination of the PersonalBenefit Requirement

The law of the land with regard to Rule lOb-5, as stated by the
majority in Dirs, is "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."' 170 It is clear that when an
insider, for example, a chief executive officer, director, or employee
of a corporation, buys or sells stock on material nonpublic information in his own name and personally benefits, he violates Rule
lOb-5.17' Based on the idea of derivative liability, if an investor
169. Id. at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 3265 (emphasis added).
171. Three situations that facially may appear to invoke the Drks doctrine include,
first, one in which a corporation, by choice of its directors or chief executive officer, withholds material information from the public for a period of time. If the news were negative, the corporate action would encourage the stock price to remain artifically high. If
the news were positive, the price would remain artifically low. In either instance, the
failure to immediately publicize the corporate news may personally benefit particular insiders or shareholders. Second, in order to capitalize on certain tax code provisions by
holding stocks for more than one year, an insider with the power to do so may be tempted
to withhold corporate news for the number of days required to meet the tax law requisites.
Third, an insider might consider withholding significant corporate information until he is
in a better financial position to take advantage of the news once made public. Since Rule

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/1

28

Lansing and Schoon: Rule 10B-5 and the Personal Benefit Requirement: Dirks v. Securit
1985]

INSIDER TRADING

knowingly trades on material nonpublic inside information obtained from a broker, and the broker is deemed to be an insider
and has received a commission from the transaction, the Dirks personal benefit requirement is also satisfied and both the investor
and the broker could be held liable for a violation of 10b-5. 172 If a
broker is found to hold no fiduciary duty, he cannot be held to the
strict disclosure requirements of insiders unless he derives some liability from his tipper. If the tipper does not receive personal gain,
however, derivative liability cannot be imposed on the broker.
One explanation for the Court's holding in Dirks is that the
Court simply wanted to encourage exposure of fraudulent corporate behavior. 173 In order to sanction Dirks' action, the Court created the personal benefit requirement, found Secrist had not
personally benefitted, and determined that Dirks was not an insider. The Dirks decision rewards the efforts of brokers who are not
insiders and who expose fraudulent activity by limiting the derivative liability of broker-tippees. Without proof of personal benefit
to the insider-tipper, the SEC cannot impose liability on the broker-tippee for disseminating information unless the broker-tippee
is deemed an insider.
The Dirks Court may have foreseen instances of brokers dispensing inside information solely for personal gain and without any
intent to expose corporate fraud, and assumed that the broker in
those circumstances could easily be judged an insider. Nevertheless, a court may seldom be able to justify categorizing a broker as
an insider.1 7 4 Therefore, the Dirks decision and its personal benefit
requirement could effectively terminate the SEC's use of lOb-5 as a
viable mechanism to police securities fraud and insider trading
where brokers are directly involved. After Dirks, if a broker is not
considered an insider and the broker transmits inside information
to investors, the broker should not fear lOb-5 liability so long as
the insider-tipper of the broker does not personally benefit. If the
SEC is to utilize Rule 10b-5 in regulating insiders who do not buy
lOb-5 only prohibits trading on material, nonpublic information, however, this type of corporate activity would not be cause for SEC investigation under the guise of Rule lOb-5 so
long as the insiders did not trade shares while the information was withheld.
172. The Supreme Court ruled that Dirks was not an insider or trader, so whether he
personally benefitted from the alleged receipt of commissions was irrelevant to the issue of
lOb-5 liability. 103 S. Ct. at 3267.
173. See generally supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
174. Brokers should not be considered insiders if they do not possess information that
others are entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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or sell stock, but rather transfer information to others so they can
do what the insiders were prohibited from doing, then the SEC
7 5
must rely on a broad interpretation of personal benefit.
Rule 10b-5 liability will be severely restricted unless personal
benefit is defined in terms other than receipt of a pecuniary gain or
76
a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Often there is no immediate return on a favor done by one for
another. If and when a favor is ever recovered, it may be very
difficult to quantify or value the returned favor and to ascertain
for which favor it is in return.
For example, suppose an insider relays material nonpublic information to a popular, successful major college football coach. The
insider's intentions may be that in the future a couple of fiftyyardline seats will become available to him or that he will occasionally be seen with the coach at lunch. Or suppose an insider's
act of releasing inside information to particular individuals enables the insider to develop an otherwise unobtainable level of esteem or power among the group of tippees. These not uncommon
situations suggest that unless a broad definition of personal benefit
is accepted, Rule 10b-5 will be unenforceable where insiders circumvent the law by taking their "profits" in non-monetary ways.
The Dirks Court declared that the personal benefit requirement
may be satisfied if the insider receives a reputational benefit from
his disclosure. 177 Nevertheless, measuring this type of benefit will
be difficult because there will typically be little, if any, tangible
evidence to establish actual receipt of a reputational benefit.
Given the difficulty of proving reputational gain, the SEC's solution may be to classify all insider "benefits" that cannot be recognized monetarily into the catchall category of "gifts."'1

78

The Dirks

Court acknowledged the "gift" classification in dicta, stating that
"[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade re175. Cf infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
176. Cf 103 S. Ct. at 3266 (majority's mention of reputational benefit).
177. 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
178. Id The Dirks majority emphasized that the elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend. The "reputational benefit" or "gift" approach
to Rule lOb-5 liability should not be considered an inferior mode of enforcement. The
Dirks Court specifically included and elaborated on "reputational benefit" as one of the
objective criteria courts should focus on when determining whether there has been a
breach of duty by an insider. Id
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semble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of profits
to the recipient."'' 79 The Dirks Court explained that one of the
reasons the insiders were not found to have personally benefited
from their actions was because their purpose was not to make a
gift of valuable information to the tippees.180

If the Supreme Court intended the intangible and unquantifiable reward received from making a gift to satisfy the personal
benefit requirement, then the requirement may not be a hurdle in
sustaining a lOb-5 liability claim. Given that an insider has conveyed material nonpublic information to an investor-tippee, it
would be a rare occasion when the SEC could not establish that, if
nothing more, the insider-tippee received some kind of emotional
benefit from making the "gift" and witnessing the tippee prosper.
If the intent of Rule 10b-5--to instill trust in the public that market prices are not controlled by insiders nor are insiders using information that was intended only for a corporate purpose to their
advantage' 8 1 -is to be fulfilled, then utilizing the "gift" theory to
prove personal benefit may be the easiest way to enforce Rule lOb5.
The gift theory may be the only way to enforce Rule 1Ob-5 with
its personal benefit requirement when an insider-shareholder releases inside information to a friend. The tippee-friend certainly
benefits if he immediately buys or sells upon receipt of the information and takes advantage of the subsequent price change that
reflects the reaction of non-tippee investors upon hearing the news.
As long as the insider himself did not buy or sell stock before the
information became public, he has not profited in any financial
sense by tipping off his friend. For the SEC, the issue now posed is
whether courts will accept the argument that a gift is a personal
benefit to the giver when he receives no physical, monetary, or
economic gain in return.
In its development of the personal benefit requirement, the
Supreme Court failed to explicitly discuss "how much" personal
benefit must be received by an insider to satisfy the requirement.
Should a de minimus amount of gain or emotional enjoyment be
sufficient, or must the personal benefit significantly enlarge the insider's pocketbook? This issue must be addressed by the courts in
the near future to determine the extent to which the new personal
179. Id
180. Id at 3268; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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benefit requirement will shield brokers from 10b-5 liability. If the
liberal "gift" theory is applied to brokers who disburse material
nonpublic information obtained from insiders, the personal benefit
requirement will provide little protection from liability. If courts
require a significant amount of benefit to the insider, brokers
might rarely be held liable for lOb-5 violations. Until this issue is
resolved, brokers cannot safely predict whether their actions may
violate lOb-5. The Dzrks decision provides some policy insight on
how future courts should interpret the personal benefit
requirement.
The policy basis of Dirks is two-fold. First, the decision in Dirks
was most likely result-oriented.182 Future courts may lend deaf
ears to moderate juggling of personal gains and instead balance
interests in order to reach a "proper" result. Second, the Dirks decision reaffirms the popular notion that brokers play a vital and
83
commendable role in the securities exchanges and markets.1
Courts may seek to promote this role in future decisions.
In Dirks, a policy decision was made in favor of exposing fraud
and preventing further injury rather than punishing for the harm
done to securities purchasers. 84 Where a greater harm will obviously result without immediate disclosure, balancing the good of
extinguishing that threat against those injured in the process seems
advisable. In addition, since the law prohibits fraudulent corporate conduct and does not encourage its concealment, a balancing
approach is appealing if it prevents section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
from being misused to legitimize concealment of corporate fraud.
The SEC in Dirks would have preferred the result in Cady, Roberts & Co., where the defendant was held to have violated Rule
lOb-5.' 85 Cady, Roberts & Co., however, involved premature trading
on nonpublic, but licit, information. 81 6 Dirks involved a different
182. See generaly Simonett, The Use of the Term "Result-Oriented" to Characterize Appellate
Decisrions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984) "The term seems to suggest that a court
is result-oriented when it proceeds to do what it wants to do; that it reasons backward
from a desired result without regard for the merits, logic, established law, or sound policy
applicable to the case." Id at 192.
183. See supra note 89.
184. See 103 S. Ct. at 3267-68, 3268 n.27.
185. 40 S.E.C. at 917; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
186. Upon news of a dividend reduction, which the broker knew was not public, the
Cady, Roberts & Co. partner sold all of the company's shares remaining in his discretionary accounts. 40 S.E.C. at 909. To avoid Rule lOb-5 liability, the Commission commented that the broker should have abstained from trading until procedures for public
release of the information had been carried out. Id at 915.
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situation. Dirks had possession of information of a criminal nature
that became more harmful the longer it remained secret. Repeated efforts had been made to bring the fraud to the attention of
the authorities, with no result. 18 7 Whether conscientious or not,
Dirks determined that it was best to disclose his information immediately rather than to abstain and allow the fraud to go on
unexposed.
The second policy statement of Dirks reaffirms the belief that
brokers serve an important function in collecting, evaluating, and
disseminating corporate information for public use and can be useful as criminal investigative tools.'18 In fact, the Justice Department's Solicitor General noted after the court of appeals' opinion
in Dirks that the decision might have an adverse effect on criminal
law enforcement. 8 9 The Supreme Court's holding, on the other
hand, may result in more exposure of corporate fraud by insiders.
For example, an employee who has knowledge of his corporate employer's fraudulent conduct may fear retribution for disclosure of
the information.19° An anonymous tip from the employee to a
broker may result in a quicker assessment of and crackdown on the
criminal activity, while maintaining the anonymity and security of
the informant.
Brokers can be used as viable and legitimate criminal enforcement tools. The SEC has limited resources. 9 1 The Commission
has neither the finances nor the manpower to investigate every alleged wrongdoing in the exchange markets. 92 The SEC acting
alone is incapable of adequately regulating the markets. Nor can
187. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
188.

See supra note 88.

189. SEC Dipute on Dirks Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at D2, col. 1. It may have
been the Justice Department's opinion that the court of appeals was distorting Rule lOb-5
beyond its intent. In a footnote to the SEC's brief to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor

General noted that Dirks was not subject to a fiduciary relationship with other traders and
there was no element of misappropriation or other misconduct in obtaining or transferring
the information. Id; see also Note, Secuntzis-nszaer Tradig: The Extension of the Duty to
Disclose MaterialInside Information, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 132, 151 n. 136 (1982).

190. Secrist claimed that Equity Funding "officers had Mafia connections which they
used to threaten the lives of employees who objected to the . . . [insurance policy]
fabrications." 681 F.2d at 829.
191. It was reported in the Wall StreetJournal,regarding an SEC filing rule on insider
stock trades, that SEC officials feel they "haven't enough money or workers to examine the
filings closely for signs of illegal trading or improper reporting." Hudson, supra note 14.
192. See id. It is interesting to note that in 1971, the SEC performed only cursory
investigations after receiving reports of questionable accounting practices at Equity Funding. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 832 n.6. The Commission took no further action. In 1973, after
Secrist brought the matter to the attention of the insurance authorities, an SEC staff attor-
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the press, which has had an historic role in discovering and exposing wrongdoing, bring criminal activity to light as swiftly in some
instances as brokers can. Newspapers and journalists must work
within the confines of reporting facts. A libel suit can be disastrous. This was precisely the conflict in Dirks. Dirks persistently
urged a reporter for the Wall Street Journalto expose the alleged
fraud that Secrist had disclosed to him. The reporter was afraid
that publishing damaging "rumors," supported only by hearsay
from former employees, might be libelous, so he declined to write a
93
story. 1
For these policy reasons, courts should construe the personal
benefit requirement in favor of analysts and brokers who uncover
fraudulent corporate activity. The efforts expended by brokers to
expose fraud should not be chilled by fears of SEC retaliation. A
broad interpretation of the personal benefit requirement should
not be applied to brokers who disclose material nonpublic information about illegal corporate conduct.
C

ProposedAlternatives

Since the liberal personal benefit requirement does not lend itself to application in situations like the one encountered in
Dirks,194 and the narrow interpretation arguably provides insufficient restraint, 95 less obtrusive means of policing broker activity
could be implemented. If the facts in Dirks arise again, the primary objective should be to expose the fraudulent corporate activity as quickly as possible. Neither the SEC nor the press can be
effective in every instance. Brokers would be more effective if they
were allowed to investigate alleged fraud and dishonesty reported
to them and then to disclose this information to their clients without the fear of 10b-5 liability. The broker could make a conscious
choice whether to expend his own resources in conducting a search
such as that executed by Dirks. If there is no merit to the charges,
then only the broker has "lost."' 9 6 Indeed, if the clients whom the
broker ill-advised did sell, they may terminate their business relaney "recommended 'delaying any type of inspection of the Equity Funding operations
until next year when more personnel . . .[would be] available.' " Id.;
see supra note 160.
193. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
196. One might actually consider the broker-advisor to have gained even if his search
for wrongdoing proves fruitless, if it initiates or reaffirms a belief that the investigated
company has commendable practices and honest management.
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tionship with him. The broker may also be liable for defamation
of the corporation which he has falsely accused of criminal behavior.' 97 If fraud is discovered, however, and a broker is permitted to
disclose to his clients and prosper as a result of sell orders, then an
adequate incentive is created to encourage brokers to accept the
inherent risks in bringing corporate fraud to the public's attention.
Therefore, one alternative to the personal benefit requirement test
is to prohibit criminal charges being filed against a broker who
unveils a fraudulent corporate scheme and does not trade in the
securities himself.
It must be emphasized that brokers should only be permitted to
disclose and trade without becoming subject to Rule 10b-5 when
the evidence reported to them is of corporate criminal activity.
Only when the broker discloses nonpublic, material information
about illegal corporate conduct is the injury to a minimum
number of investors justified by the greater public good which accrues as the crime is quickly discovered and exposed. This rule
would not alter the application or the effectiveness of Rule lOb-5
in any other way.
Another alternative is for the SEC to promulgate regulations
specifically detailing disclosure procedures when a broker receives
material nonpublic information concerning illegal corporate conduct. 19 Nevertheless, if brokers are required to immediately report corporate fraud to the SEC and to refrain from disclosing
such information to their clients, the harm and illegalities could
continue indefinitely due to the insufficient resources of the SEC.
A more realistic rule would require a broker to disclose corporate
197. A corporation can be defamed based on its honesty, credit, efficency, and other
business characteristics. See, e.g., Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union 2928,
152 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1945) (a corporation has a business reputation which is protected by law); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 82 F.2d
115, 118 (8th Cir. 1936) (corporation has the right to bring a libel action for publication
that attacks its credit or management and inflicts injury on its business or property); Maytag Co. v. Meadow Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 843 (1930)
("the legal principles constituting the law of libel and slander are the same whether corporations or individuals are involved"). See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS 779 (5th ed. 1984) (defamation of corporations).
198. The SEC took such an approach after Chiarella. The Commission did not acquiesce in that decision and subsequently promulgated Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(1983), which makes unlawful the use of manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent practices
in connection with tender offers. Id; see also Heller, supra note 3, at 541 n.58. In the same
way that Rule 14e-3 more specifically details lawful tender offer practices, Rule i0b-5's
objectives and requirements could be redefined in order to enlighten investors, insiders,
the SEC, and the courts as to its practical effects.
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criminal behavior to the SEC. A ten-day period would then begin
in which the broker could not disclose the information. The Commission would have ten days to determine the truth of the accusations against the corporation and to take any affirmative action.
The expiration of the ten-day "grace" period would entitle the
broker to disclose the information and permit tippees to trade on it
even if the information was still nonpublic. Additionally, a rule
could require that a complaint filed by a broker become a matter
of public record when the grace period ends. In that way, unknowing purchasers would be afforded notice and an opportunity
to further investigate a prospective securities investment.
The advantage of the above plan is that if the SEC believed it
could be effective, it would have a specified number of days to
prove it. If Dirks-type communication and trading occurred
within that period allotted exclusively to the SEC, that activity
would be a clear violation of the law. Hence, predictability would
exist. Where the Commission did not take the initiative to investigate charges of fraud or dishonesty within ten days of the initial
report, the cost would be that the alleged crime would be given
extended life. In that instance, however, the possible harm to the
public from a few additional days of nondisclosure would be much
less than the injury to unwary purchasers if brokers and their clients were allowed to conduct business on nonpublic information
during the same period. After the ten days, if the SEC had not
confirmed the allegations, brokers would have the same incentives
to investigate and disclose information in an attempt to unmask
corporate fraud. Once it was recognized that the SEC would not
conduct its own search, and that a crime may continue indefinitely, the balance would be struck in favor of permitting Dirkstype activity in the exchange markets.
If the purpose of the insider trading regulations is to protect investors, then another solution might be to impose only civil sanctions, but with treble damages, for all trading violations. By this
alternative, unwary purchasers could be restored to their original
status by reimbursement from the knowing seller. The treble damages would be a powerful deterrent against traders' temptations to
benefit illegally from their inside information.
If a balancing of interests approach is not applied, then the type
of information that is conveyed to a broker and subsequently disclosed to clients without first being made public should be irrelevant in a Rule lOb-5 analysis, regardless of whether it concerns
fraud, dividend increases, or deductions. Similarly, the important
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role that a broker plays in unmasking a crime should be ignored if
a balancing test is disregarded. If the interests of the public as a
whole are to be overlooked, the courts must resolve 10b-5 cases
strictly on the issues of duty and personal benefit or motive.
If the public wishes to have corporate fraud exposed and
stopped as swiftly as possible, however, this latter option is to be
strongly discouraged. The courts and the SEC have had obvious
difficulty discerning predictable standards by which actions alleged to violate Rule lOb-5 can be measured. Both have been inconsistent in their interpretations of the elements of a 10b-5
violation. Brokers are unable to safely predict whether their disclosures will result in criminal or civil charges being brought
against them.
VII.

CONCLUSION

No clear impact on the behavior of brokers and investors is evident in the wake of the Supreme Court's new personal benefit requirement. If courts use the new standard as a means of balancing
brokers' and traders' justifications for insider trading against losses
sustained by unknowing investors, then the personal benefit rule
will be a hindrance to SEC prosecution of Rule 10b-5 cases against
brokers who disclose material nonpublic information but do not
trade personally. If the personal benefit test was contrived, on the
other hand, as an exception in order to absolve only Dirks, then
perhapsthe new rule will be flexibly construed and easily satisfied
in most insider trading cases. In that case, the personal benefit
requirement will add nothing new to securities law.
Since an implicit goal of the securities laws is to minimize victimization of unwary investors, 99 a narrow application of the personal benefit requirement should be administered to encourage
disclosure of corporate fraud by brokers who might otherwise fear
prosecution under Rule 10b-5. This assumes that brokers are permitted to reveal nonpublic information to clients concerning illegal behavior within a corporation without subjecting themselves to
criminal or civil liability. If courts broadly rule that insiders personally benefit in some respect whenever they distribute information to brokers, the new rule will frustrate the efforts of brokers to
research and disclose instances of corporate criminal activity that
199. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

might otherwise go undetected by the SEC or other enforcement
agencies.
Ambiguity surrounds not only what is required to satisfy the
component terms of Rule lOb-5, 2°° but also what are Rule 10b-5's
specific requirements. Presently, there appears to be little, if any,
predictability in the law with respect to Rule lOb-5. This is cause
enough for defendants to raise serious arguments against most
SEC allegations of insider trading. The need for clarification of
the securities laws is most evident in the Dirks-type situation where
a securities advisor, or any other individual, engaged in a good
faith effort to uncover corporate criminal activity, must risk violating Rule 10b-5. Our society encourages the public to expose fraud
and deceit, and it should not permit the threat of insider trading
sanctions to have an adverse effect on criminal law enforcement.
Furthermore, as long as commentators urge that there are significant economic reasons for engaging in insider trading, attempts to
refine the respective securities laws to allow limited insider trading
20 1
will appear.
Notwithstanding the attitudes one holds with respect to the purpose and effectiveness of the federal securities laws on insider trading, some changes are in order. Too many issues persistently
remain unanswered. Without future legislative or agency action,
Dirks will not be the Supreme Court's last word on Rule 10b-5.
200. For example, terms such as "insider," "material information," and "disclosure,"
are not delineated in the Rule.

201.

Seesupra note 31.
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